The use of current performance as a partial basis for setting future targets is an almost universal feature of economic planning. This "ratchet principle," as it is sometimes called, creates a dynamic incentive problem for the enterprise. Higher rewards from better current performance must be weighed against the future assignment of more ambitious targets. In this paper I formulate the problem of the enterprise as a multiperiod stochastic optimization model incorporating an explicit feedback mechanism for target setting. I show that an optimal solution is easily characterized, and that the incentive effects of the ratchet principle can be fully analyzed in simple economic terms.
Introduction
* Understanding how incentive systems work is an important task of economic theory. To date, most analyses of reward structures have been essentially static (Weitzman, 1976 and references cited there). For some situations this is not a serious limitation, but, certain important incentive issues have an inherently dynamic character that cannot even be formulated, let alone analyzed, in a timeless framework (Yunker, 1973; Weitzman, 1976; Snowberger, 1977) .
Consider the "standard reward system. " Let y be a performance indicator for the enterprise. In most settings, y will symbolize output, but profits, cost, or productivity might be the appropriate performance measure in some contexts. Let the target, goal, or quota be denoted q. In a standard reward system the variable component of an enterprise's bonus is typically proportional to the difference between y and q; where the relationship is more complicated, proportionality is still a good approximation for most analytical purposes.
There are two basic incentive problems associated with a standard reward system: one is static and the other is dynamic. The immediate difficulty is essentially a static problem of misrepresentation which has to do with bluffing or gaming in hopes of influencing the plan while it is being formulated. The worker or manager will typically try to convince his superiors that y is likely to be small, thereby entitling him to a lower q and a bonus that is easier to attain. To focus sharply on the dynamic incentive problem, the present paper abstracts from the static misrepresentation issue by not allowing the planners to base quotas on any message other than previous actual output.
The dynamic incentive problem, on which this paper concentrates, arises from the well-known tendency of planners to use current performance as a criterion in determining future goals. This tendency has sometimes been called the "ratchet principle" of economic planning, because current performance acts like a notched gear wheel in fixing the point of departure for next period's target. ' Operation of the ratchet principle is widespread in planning or regulatory contexts ranging from the determination of piecework standards for individual workers to fixing budgets or output quotas for large bureaucracies. In such situations, agents face a dynamic tradeoff between present rewards from better current performance and future losses from the assignment of higher targets.
Realistic treatment of the ratchet principle necessitates a multiperiod stochastic statement of the enterprise's problem, which at first glance appears to be extremely complicated. One of the principal aims of this paper is to show that under a reasonable formulation, the enterprise's dynamic problem can be easily solved and given a neat economic interpretation. In this formulation, the effect of the ratchet principle on economic performance is simple to state and analyze.
The model m
The economic unit whose behavior we shall be studying is called an "enterprise." This term is employed in a broad sense because, depending on the context, the unit might be an individual worker, an intermediate sized department, or a giant sector. The enterprise operates in a planned environment where it and the planners interact; the environment might be a multidivisional private firm, a government or quasi-public organization, or a nationalized branch of the economy.
Let t = 1, 2, 3, . . . index the plan period. Enterprise performance during any period will typically be affected by the plan target for that period and will in turn influence the formation of next period's target.
The planning period discount rate is denoted r. That is, next period's gains are transformed into this period's by the factor 1/(1 + r). If p is the instantaneous force of interest and I is the length of the plan period, 1 P 1 ?r or r =eP-1.
Thus, the size of r depends on the length of the review lag I and the interest rate p. The variable Yt will symbolize performance of the enterprise in period t. It is perhaps easiest to think of inputs being exogenously determined and let Yt denote output; and, for convenience, this will be our primary interpretation. As noted earlier, though, profits or productivity could also be accommodated as measures of performance. In budgeting contexts it may be more appropriate to envision a fixed task given in period t and have Yt be a negative output representing the funds needed to accomplish the task.
Let Et be a random variable, known at time t but uncertain before, which characterizes cost or technological conditions of the enterprise during period t. For ease of exposition, it will be assumed the {Et} are independently distributed.
Given conditions described by Et, if the enterprise chooses to perform at level Yt in period t, it incurs net disutility, loss, or cost Ct(yt; Et) exclusive of any bonus payments received. The cost of performance is typically timedependent because the means available for meeting plan assignments, treated here as exogenously predetermined, may differ from period to period. For example, a growing enterprise will frequently have an ever increasing capacity to utilize. It is postulated that for all Et, Ci' ? 0,
which ensures that second-order conditions are always met.2 We denote the performance target in period t as qt. We assume that the bonus received by the enterprise is proportional to the difference between actual performance and the plan target:
where b is a bonus coefficient. In reality bonus systems tend to be more complex, but the present formulation is a first-order approximation that fairly represents many situations.
If 
The expectation operator E in (5) is taken over the random variables {8t}, {Xt}, and {Et}. Given the passive target-setting behavior of the planners, the problem of the enterprise is to maximize expected present discounted value5, or to find a set of optimal decision rules {y*(qt, Et)} satisfying V(fyt*(qtEt)l) = max V({yt(qt,Et)}).
{ yt(qt,Et)} This problem is representative of a class of models which attempt to characterize optimal behavior in the presence of a regulatory lag. We assume that the problem (5)- (8) is well defined and that an optimal solution exists. The issue of existence is not of interest in its own right; and, in any event, it is not difficult to specify a set of sufficient conditions for (5) Then, the optimal strategy is always to perform at the constant levely * satisfying C'(y*)= b
1+-r
Perhaps it is easiest to think of {y*} as the performance levels that would be elicited if the same hypothetical "ratchet price" Note that the optimal value y* does not depend on qt. Given the second-order condition (2) and no constraint on the domain of yt, the optimal value y* must be an interior solution satisfying (9). This concludes our proof of the form of an optimal policy.
